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In the past decade, there has been an increasing reliance on electronic means of transferring  
funds for personal and business purposes. One recent development has been the emergence  
of plastic cards with the capacity to store value electronically, which can be used for a range  
of retail transactions. With the advent of comprehensive anti-money laundering laws throughout  
the developed world, criminals are turning to alternative ways of moving funds across borders to 
circumvent reporting and detection systems. One identified risk is the misuse of prepaid stored  
value cards to keep the proceeds of crime and move them across borders without alerting law 
enforcement and financial intelligence units. This paper describes the nature of these risks and 
considers whether existing regulatory measures are adequate to address them.
Judy Putt 
General Manager, Research
The use of electronic transactions has increased considerably in recent years. In Australia, the volume 
and value of cheque transactions in paper-based clearing systems fell from an average of 2.7 million 
per day in 2001 to 2.1 million in 2005, and from an average of $8.3b per day in 2001 to $6.3b in 
2005 (APCA 2005). A correspondingly large increase in electronic banking has also been observed. 
This is hardly surprising, as the financial incentive to do business electronically in today’s highly 
competitive market is significant, with the cost of an online transaction often being a fraction  
of a non-electronic transaction (De Young 2001). Similarly, online retail spending has increased 
considerably with total sales in the United States in 2007 exceeding US$100b (Ames 2007). One  
of the more popular electronic payment systems is prepaid stored value cards (SVCs), such as gift 
cards issued by retail stores.
The overall market for gift cards is projected to grow to nearly $88 billion in 2008, with the 
fastest growth occurring in corporate purchases of gift cards for employees and customers, 
and in “open” gift cards – like the American Express Gift Card that can be redeemed at multiple 
merchants…. Corporate purchases will rise 72% from 2005 to 2008, growing from [US]$9 billion 
to [US]$15.5 billion. Open gift card sales are expected to almost quadruple from 2005 to 2008, 
growing from [US]$1.3 billion to [US]$5 billion, according to Mercator (American Express 2006).
This extensive use of SVCs, coupled with the convergence of financial services and electronic 
payment technologies, has created new opportunities for money laundering. This paper examines 
the nature of the risks and how they can best be addressed.
Prepaid stored value cards
Stored value cards are cards with data encoded in either a magnetic strip or a computer chip  
that are preloaded with a fixed amount of electronic currency or value. This can be redeemed or 
transferred to individuals and/or merchants in a manner that is similar to spending physical currency. 
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The players in a typical SVC program 
include:
program managers – owners of •	
prepaid SVC programs who establish 
relationships with payment processing 
facilities (e.g. banks and payment 
networks) and distributors, and 
establish pooled account(s) at banks
payment processing facilities – are •	
responsible for payment transactions 
for prepaid SVC programs, and they 
track and distribute funds in pooled 
accounts. Program managers may 
also choose to function as their own 
payment processors
banks – may also function as program •	
managers and/or distributors, and are 
responsible for maintaining pooled 
accounts, settling payments and 
issuing branded prepaid SVCs 
(open-system cards)
the payments network – the ‘link’ •	
between payment processing 
facilities, and the retailer and 
automated teller machine (ATM), for 
authorisation of payment transactions
a distributor (e.g. banks and non-•	
financial institutions) – responsible for 
selling prepaid SVCs.
The market for SVCs has increased 
considerably over the years, particularly 
in terms of its availability and size. A 
recent study by Mercator Advisory Group 
estimated that ‘[US]$171.18 Billion was 
loaded on Closed Loop Prepaid Solutions 
in 2006, an increase of 13.9% over the 
2005 spend of [US]$160.29 [billion]’ 
(Sloane 2007). Another study on prepaid 
general-purpose spending cards (open 
system cards) predicted that more than 
300 million individuals in Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, 
Central America and Dominican Republic) 
could have prepaid cards that do not 
require bank accounts by 2015. The 
spending power is estimated to be more 
than US$214b (NovoPayment 2008).
This is, perhaps, not surprising, 
considering the many benefits associated 
with SVCs: 
easy to get and use (cardholder/ •	
buyer anonymity) – credit checks are 
not required when purchasing SVCs 
and for some cards, evidence of 
identification is also not needed
convenient – SVCs can be •	
purchased, reloaded (for open  
and semi-open card systems),  
and redeemed and refunded at 
conveniently located participating 
merchant locations (e.g. supermarkets 
and convenience stores).  
The UK-based pay-as-you-go 
MasterCard® card, for example, 
allows cardholders to obtain their 
balance, top up their card or lock/
unlock their card for added security, 
from anywhere, 24 hours a day,  
by sending text messages from  
a registered mobile phone  
(Payments News 2008)
affordable – funds are immediately •	
available, often at a lower cost than 
when using traditional banking 
services
reduced overdraft risk – reduces the •	
risk of overdrafts while providing 
nearly immediate liquidity for 
consumers.
The PaymentsDynamicsSM 2007 study 
also found that ease of use, universal 
acceptance, the ability to use one’s  
own money, safety and security, and  
the ability to have control over one’s 
finances are the key drivers for the 
growth of prepaid cards in the  
unbanked population (Abal 2007).
SVCs can be categorised broadly into 
open systems (or open-loop systems), 
semi-open systems, closed systems (or 
closed-loop systems) and semi-closed 
systems (Table 1). 
Table 1: Categories of stored value cards
Types Description Anonymous? Reloadable? Examples
Open system 
cards
Typically branded (e.g. by 
American Express) and 
connected to global debit and 
ATM networks, which allow the 
cards to be used for multiple 
purposes and at multiple points 
of sale with different participating 
merchants
Typically no (similar in 
appearance to traditional  
debit cards, which are 
embossed with the 
cardholder’s name  
and the expiry date)
Typically yes (e.g. via regular 
deposit arrangement, internet 
and at participating merchant 
outlets)
Visa cash passport card a,  
a reloadable pin-protected 
Visa-branded SVC, which allows 
cardholders to withdraw cash from 
Visa ATMs worldwide and use the 




Generally have the same  
features as open system cards, 
but cannot be used to access 
cash at ATMs (also known as 
purchasing-only cards)
Typically no (similar in 
appearance to traditional debit 
cards, which are embossed 
with the cardholder’s name 
and the expiry date)
Typically yes NETS CashCard b
Closed 
system cards
Limited to only buying goods  
or services from the merchant 
issuing the card
Typically yes Typically no, and sold at preset 
denominations, but some retail 
gift cards are reloadable
David Jones Gift Card c
Semi-closed 
system cards
Can be used at a selected group  
of merchants or service providers
Typically yes Typically no, and sold at preset 
denominations
FlyBuys gift cards d, which can only 
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Open system cards typically allow high 
values to be loaded and kept on cards. 
Open system cards that are designed  
to facilitate cross-border remittance 
payments are also offered by offshore 
banks. Such systems often allow multiple 
cards to be issued per account, so that 
friends and family in receiving countries 
can use the cards to access cash and 
make purchases, without additional 
information being provided or existing 
information confirmed.
The Travelex Cash Passport card in 
Australia, for example, has a maximum 
card balance value (at any one time)  
of A$10,000; a maximum amount that 
can be loaded onto the card during any 
12-month period of A$45,000; a 24-hour 
ATM withdrawal limit of A$6,000; and up 
to two cards able to be issued per Cash 
Passport fund.
Closed and semi-closed systems, 
conversely, are typically used for 
micropayments in view of their limited 
storage capacity. Such cards can be 
purchased without the need for any 
evidence of identification or prior  
account history.
In the same way that legitimate 
businesses will look at market forces  
and new opportunities for SVCs, 
criminals will also explore new areas  
that can be exploited to maximise their 
profits, and to evade the scrutiny of law 
enforcement agencies and regulators.
The widespread availability of SVCs 
(particularly at non-financial outlets),  
the high loading and card balance value 
limits of open system cards, and the 
anonymity offered by closed and semi-
closed system cards could be abused  
by organised criminals for illicit financial 
transactions, money laundering and bulk 
cash smuggling, particularly as value 
limits increase. Stored value cards have 
been identified in several reports as a 
potential tool for organised crime groups 
to launder their illicit crime proceeds 
(APG 2005; US NDIC 2006). A study on 
cross-border electronic funds transfer 
systems raises similar concerns:
In virtually every investigation of  
these groups, the movement of the 
proceeds of the criminal acts from 
the U.S. back to Canada, whether  
by movement of bulk cash, funds 
transfers, or stored value cards, has 
been significant (FinCEN 2007a: 100).
Money laundering concerns
Although the actual amount of money 
being laundered will never be known with 
accuracy, money laundering transactions 
in Australia are estimated to involve 
between $2b (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants 2006) and $4.5b per year 
(Walker et al. 2007). The International 
Monetary Fund has further suggested 
that money laundering transactions are 
approximately two to five percent of the 
global gross domestic product. Money 
laundering could, potentially, lead to a 
shift of economic power to organised 
crime groups, thus eroding Australia’s 
political and social systems. 
To disguise the origins of illicit  
proceeds, criminals can perform a  
series of business transactions such as 
transferring electronic currency through  
a series of offshore companies and 
purchasing goods for resale, prior to 
integrating the ‘cleaned’ proceeds into 
the legitimate financial system. The 
money laundering process is typically 
segmented into three stages: 
placement – in which illegal funds  •	
or assets are introduced into the 
financial system, or converted into 
monetary instruments (e.g. SVCs)
layering – in which the illegal origins  •	
of placed funds are disguised
integration – in which disguised funds •	
are made available for investment in 
legitimate or illegitimate businesses.
Placement
In general, it is relatively easy to purchase 
SVCs, because customers do not 
generally require a bank account to 
acquire them. Applications for stored 
value cards can usually be accepted 
online, via fax or through non-financial 
outlets (e.g. local cheque-cashing outlets 
and convenience stores), which may not 
require any face-to-face verification of 
cardholder identity. Small to medium-
sized non-financial distributors are also 
unlikely to have an adequate, or any, 
risk-based program based on the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth)  
(AML/CTF Act) in place, and may not 
carry out customer due diligence and 
have trained staff in the areas of money 
laundering detection.
In cases where face-to-face verification  
of cardholder identity is required, 
evidence of identity may be difficult  
to verify, particularly at non-financial 
Events that may raise suspicions
An excessively obstructive or •	
secretive client.
Customer asks questions or •	
makes comments that raise 
suspicions (e.g. questions such 
as ‘Will these purchases be 
reported to the authorities?’).
Large payments made in actual •	
cash (especially if the cash is 
wrapped in currency straps).
Customer purchases a large •	
quantity of stored value cards, 
particularly reloadable open 
system or semi-open system 
cards, in an apparent effort to 
avoid triggering identification  
or reporting requirements – an 
activity also known as structuring.
Customer purchases a large •	
quantity of stored value cards  
of large denomination that is  
not commensurate with normal 
business activities.
For open system card purchases •	
at banks, customer makes a large 
number of stored value card 
transactions using the banks’ 
services or third-party online 
payment systems, which appear 
inconsistent with the stated 
business activities.
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distribution outlets (e.g. verification of a 
foreign passport at a convenience store). 
A criminal can, therefore, easily purchase 
large quantities of stored value cards 
(perhaps with different issuers) using 
cash generated from criminal proceeds, 
and it may then be possible to take these 
overseas without detection. Even if cards 
are located at entry ports, customs 
officials may be unable to ascertain how 
much value is loaded on each card. 
Individuals can also be recruited by 
organised crime groups to purchase 
SVCs using stolen credit cards. These 
individuals (‘card mules’) may be 
recruited through email messages, 
websites or newspaper advertisements 
that purport to be legitimate businesses 
seeking new staff. One US case involved  
the arrest of a six-member syndicate  
in March 2007. Arrests were made by  
the Gainesville Police Department for 
allegedly using stolen credit cards to 
purchase large quantities of Wal-Mart 
and Sam’s Club gift cards (US FDLE 
2007).
Layering
Depending on the types of cards 
purchased during the placement  
stage, value can either be redeemed  
for merchandise or sent overseas.
Closed or semi-closed cards – These 
can be redeemed for merchandise. For 
example, in the arrests made by the 
Gainesville Police Department, the 
purchased cards were redeemed for 
merchandise such as computers, gaming 
devices and large-screen televisions (US 
FDLE 2007). The redeemed merchandise 
can either be sent overseas or resold and 
the proceeds remitted to third-party  
accounts (minus a commission). 
Another recent US example involved the 
arrest of four Russians who, it was noted: 
[then transferred] the fraudulently-
obtained money and goods back  
to Russia. ... Using stolen identity 
and credit information, defendant 
CHUGAEV made on-line purchases 
of PayPal cards, gift cards, 
computers, and other merchandise, 
and requested that the items be 
shipped to United States addresses 
under the control of his associates. 
Those associates quickly withdrew 
cash from the credit cards, then 
deposited the cash into bank 
accounts, and allowed CHUGAEV 
to withdraw the stolen money in 
Russia using ATM cards associated 
with the bank accounts. The 
computers and other merchandise 
were repackaged … in the United 
States and mailed on to Russia, 
where the stolen goods were resold 
(US DoJ 2007).
SVCs can also be ‘purchased for 
currency and transferred from one  
person to another and resold [because 
beneficiaries’ names are not required]. 
Often, a firm independent of a bank 
processes all card transactions through  
a “pooled” bank account held in the 
name of the firm managing the card 
program’ (US FFIEC 2007: 206). The  
use of pooled accounts also increases 
the difficulty in monitoring any specific 
cardholder’s activity.
Open or semi-open cards – Due to  
the worldwide acceptance of these cards 
(as most of the open system cards have 
access to the Plus and Cirrus/Maestro 
networks), card mules can be instructed 
to mail the purchased stored value cards 
to countries with lax anti-money 
laundering legislation where funds can 
then be withdrawn from local ATMs 
(including ‘white label’ ATMs – machines 
that offer only cash dispensing services). 
FINTRAC (2007: 24) pointed out that 
white label ATMs ‘can be “self-loaded” 
with illicit funds, increasing the potential 
for money laundering. The involvement of 
organized crime was a key characteristic 
of disclosure cases involving white label 
ATMs this year’. 
SVCs can also be easily taken through 
border controls because of their size – 
they are often in wallets, which may not 
be subject to scrutiny. 
In another US case, the alleged 
mastermind of an international theft  
ring deposited money into several SVCs 
and sent six of the cards to Russia where 
his co-conspirators retrieved the money  
from ATMs (FinCEN 2007b: 25).
Integration
SVCs, particularly those used in open 
systems, can also be used as a means  
of payment by criminals. For example, 
precursor chemicals used in the 
production of illegal drugs, real estate 
investment, or life insurance policies 
could be paid for with SVCs.
SVCs can also be used as a means of 
payment for services rendered. In one 
case, a former employee of the Ohio 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles was prosecuted 
in connection with selling fraudulent Ohio 
drivers’ licences in 2005. It was reported 
that she was paid using US$10 phone 
cards (US ICE 2005). 
Events that may raise suspicions
Customer makes payments using •	
multiple payment methods or  
a large number of stored value 
cards.
Customer purchasing pattern •	
does not make economic sense 
(e.g. an individual customer pays 
for numerous laptops using 
several cards).
The merchandise, particularly •	
high-value and low-volume goods 
such as consumer electronics 
being shipped, appears 
inconsistent with the exporter’s 
stated business activities or the 
merchandise is shipped to a 
jurisdiction designated as ‘high 
risk’ for money laundering 
activities.
Stored value cards, particularly •	
open or semi-open system  
cards (particularly with a large 
denomination), being sent 
through the post or found on 
travellers that appear inconsistent 
with the stated business activities 
(similar to bulk cash smuggling).
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Legislative framework
The AML/CTF Act was enacted to 
enhance Australia’s capacity to detect, 
prevent and combat money laundering, 
and to bring Australia in line with 
international best practice in detecting 
and deterring money laundering.
Designated services
The AML/CTF Act presently covers 
industry sectors with obligations under 
existing legislation, including the banking 
and finance sector, and other persons or 
businesses providing designated 
services. Industry sectors are considered 
‘reporting entities’ under the AML/CTF 
Act when they provide ‘designated 
services’ defined in Section 6 of the  
AML/CTF Act. Although SVCs were not 
regulated under the Financial Transaction 
Reports Act 1988 (Cth), issuing and 
reloading SVCs are now listed as 
designated services under the  
AML/CTF Act. 
Entities providing designated services  
are subject to the full range of AML/CTF 
regulatory controls such as statutory 
reporting of suspicious activity, 
recordkeeping, and developing and 
implementing a risk-based AML/CTF 
program. As the main regulatory 
obligations under the AML/CTF Act are 
civil penalty provisions, non-compliance 
may attract a civil penalty (a fine up to 
A$2.2 million and A$11 million for 
individuals and corporations).
Section 81 of the AML/CTF Act requires 
all reporting entities to have an anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorism 
financing (AML/CTF) program in place  
by 12 December 2007. The AML/CTF 
program includes general provisions 
concerning risk management and  
specific requirements concerning 
customer identification. 
Banks and major financial institutions 
recognise the importance of sound 
ongoing customer due diligence policies 
and procedures (e.g. Know Your 
Customer) to reduce their reputational 
risk (e.g. maintain their brand and 
reputation in a competitive world market 
sensitive to the threats of international 
organised crime), legal risk and financial 
risk; and have monitoring systems in 
place to prevent exploitation of SVCs  
(e.g. monitoring of reloading above  
a threshold value).
In terms of customer identification  
at point of purchase or where value is 
reloaded onto SVCs, major banks and 
financial institutions employ technologies 
to detect forged identification documents 
and carry out enhanced customer due 
diligence for cardholders who reload 
SVCs frequently, have cash access  
and/or use their cards outside Australia.
In relation to monitoring SVC usage  
and detecting suspicious patterns or  
high-risk situations, real-time transaction 
monitoring using monitoring technologies 
is used. These technologies can be 
broadly categorised into:
rules-based systems – assess •	
individual transactions against a set  
of predefined rules based on value 
thresholds and other criteria
pattern recognition systems – use •	
sophisticated techniques such as 
neural networks, link analysis, peer 
group analysis, time sequence 
matching and name recognition 
technologies to monitor for a library  
of known patterns and scenarios
hybrid systems – allow a combination •	
of rules writing by monitoring against 
a library of known patterns. 
Conclusion
To reduce the money laundering risk, 
SVC providers need to be aware of and 
comply with local regulatory requirements 
such as AML/CTF regulation, and 
prudential and financial regulations. 
Compliance with these measures can, 
however, be challenging and expensive 
for SVC providers, although the potential 
legal liability and reputational risk for 
non-compliance can be significantly 
costly. 
Tsingou (2005: 15) pointed out that ‘[t]he 
burden of compliance is more significant 
for smaller, local institutions, where  
“know your customer” and reporting 
requirements are less automated’. 
Prohibitive AML compliance costs, 
unlikely to be affordable by small to 
medium-sized non-financial distributors, 
might have the unintended consequence 
of driving the small players underground 
or driving providers (and users) of SVCs 
to less restrictive and less costly 
jurisdictions (regulatory arbitrage).
The process of disintermediation currently 
experienced in SVC programs (whereby 
physical contact between organisations 
and their clients is replaced by virtual 
contact) also compounds the challenge 
of customer identity verification at 
distribution outlets, particularly small to 
medium-sized non-financial distributors. 
Individuals in the unbanked sector may 
be unable to meet AML regulatory 
demands in terms of providing 
identification documentation such  
as passports or driving licences.
Reporting obligations
Anyone travelling into or out of Australia, 
or mailing/shipping currency, may have 
reporting obligations under Part 4 of  
the AML/CTF Act, with regard to cross-
border movements of physical currency 
(carrying, mailing or shipping) and 
cross-border movements of bearer-
Events that may raise suspicions
Living standards of employees  •	
(or public officials) exceed their 
known lawful income or if they 
control or possess pecuniary 
resources or property, that are 
disproportionate to their present 
or past known sources of income, 
and when they are unable or 
unwilling to account for the 
discrepancy.
Transactions incompatible with •	
the customer’s normal activity  
or are beyond the customer’s 
apparent financial means are 
causes for concern (e.g. a lump 
sum payment for real estate or  
life insurance in cash).
The AIC is a statutory body with a 
Board of Management comprising 
Australian, state and territory 
government representatives, 
administered under the Criminology 
Research Act 1971.
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mailing or shipping SVCs out of the 
United States. A report would be filed 
each time an individual transports, mails 
or ships SVCs (having an aggregate value 
exceeding US$10,000) at one time into 
or out of the country.
Need for further research
To date, there are few reliable data on 
risks of this kind. This has resulted in a 
lack of well-developed research about 
money laundering using electronic 
payment systems such as SVCs, 
especially in comparison with other 
traditional banking systems. There is, 
therefore, a need to further analyse the 
SVC industry to determine possible ways 
in which the industry could be better 
regulated.
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However, there are no reporting 
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proceeds could, therefore, be smuggled 
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aware (FinCEN 2007b: 25). Reporting 
obligations should, arguably, be extended 
to anyone mailing or shipping SVCs out 
of Australia to minimise risks of abuse by 
criminals.
The US government has recognised  
the potential for money launderers to 
exploit SVCs. On 24 July 2007, the 
Violent Crime Control Act of 2007  
was introduced to the House by US 
representative, Lamar Smith, (http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd? 
bill=h110-3156) and the Senate by 
Senator John Cornyn (http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill= 
s110-1860). The Act includes a  
provision relating to SVCs. The text  
of the proposed provision, Section 338: 
Stored value cards (Section 5312(a)(3)  
of title 31, United States Code), states:
... the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall provide by regulation for 
purposes of sections 5316 and 
5331, stored value cards or other 
similar devices including funds  
or monetary value represented in 
digital electronics format (whether 
or not specially encrypted) and 
stored or capable of storage on 
electronic media in such a way as 
to be retrievable and transferable 
electronically.
Linn (2008) pointed out that if the Bill  
is enacted, cross-border reporting 
obligations will be extended to anyone 
